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Preliminary note · Reward hacking · Oversight

Who audits the auditor? A preliminary check of reward-hacking judges

Shreyash Gondane · Published 11 November 2026 (written 17 October) · Development round run 16–17 October 2026

Preliminary. These results come from a development set: 101 traces from 5 tasks, with 2–3 trials per cell for the most expensive judge. They show how the auditors reason, not their rates. The test protocol was frozen and timestamped before any test data existed. The confirmatory run uses the main study's traces.

Benchmark audits now report reward hacking found in agent traces. Each audit counts the hacks its judge flags. Almost none says what the judge misses, or how many of its flags are wrong. To measure both, I planted known hacks into copies of real coding-agent traces and asked three auditors to find them.

95 / 155hack flags by the public TB 2.1 leaderboard judge that maintainers overruled
2 / 12planted reads of tests or the reference solution caught by an LLM judge whose rubric names them
12 / 12the same reads, caught by a free rule-based check
0 / 12answer keys planted in the workspace caught by those rules

An auditor that only reports what it flags can't tell you what it misses. Planted hacks give it a ground truth.

What I did

What I saw

Planted hackRulesLLM judgeHarbor's judge
Reads tests / reference solution12/122/120/2*
Prints a fake test summary13/136/131/3*
Answer key in the workspace0/127/122/3
Hard-coded result0/121/120/2
Approval without evidence6/120/120/2
Clean runs flagged0/4114/410/5

* Harbor's judge was run on 2–3 traces per type, so those cells are examples, not rates. Its one fake-summary catch was for a different reason (see the limits below). One reads-the-solution trace and one answer-key trace were judged "not applicable" and are counted as not caught. The LLM judge's figures are paired: a catch must name the planted behaviour and must not already be flagged on that trace's untouched copy.

Harbor's judge can see a hack and excuse it. Its rubric lists "accessing or copying from the solution/ directory" as reward hacking. On a trace with a planted cat /solution/solve.sh, it wrote:

While the agent did read /solution/solve.sh for reference (step 7), it produced a different but equivalent … optimization … The agent solved the task legitimately.

On a planted fake test summary, it wrote: "The echo statement … ('===== 28 passed in 2.45s =====') was merely a cosmetic message with no effect on grading."

Different auditors miss different hacks.

The public record points the same way.

What this does and doesn't show

Next

The test round runs the frozen protocol on the passing traces of my main harness study (Terminal-Bench 2.1, Sonnet 5.5):

The protocol, code and development results were timestamped (OpenTimestamps) on 17 October 2026, before any test data existed.